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Abstract. Using a set of heterogeneous competing systems with intra-system cooperation and inter-system
aggression, we show how the coevolution of the system parameters (degree of organization and conditions
for aggression) depends on the rate of supply of resources S˙. The model consists of a number of units
grouped into systems that compete for the resource S; within each system several units can be aggregated
into cooperative arrangements whose size is a measure of the degree of organization in the system. Ag-
gression takes place when the systems release inhibitors that impair the performance of other systems.
Using a mean field approximation we show that i) even in the case of identical systems there are stable
inhomogeneous solutions, ii) a system steadily producing inhibitors needs large perturbations to leave this
regime, and iii) aggression may give comparative advantages. A discrete model is used in order to examine
how the particular configuration of the units within a system determines its performance in the presence
of aggression. We find that full-scale, one sided aggression is only profitable for less-organized systems, and
that systems with a mixture of degrees of organization exhibit robustness against aggression. By using a
genetic algorithm we find that, in terms of the full-occupation resource supply rate S˙F , the coevolution of
the set of systems displays the following behavior: i) for S˙ < S˙F /10 aggressions are irrelevant and most
systems exhibit a high degree of organization; ii) For S˙F /10 < S˙ < S˙F /3 aggressions are frequent, making
systems with a low degree of organization competitive; iii) for S˙F/3 < S˙ < S˙F /2 the systems display
global evolutive transitions between periods of calm (few aggressions and high degree of organization)
and periods of belligerence (frequent aggressions and low degree of organization); iv) for S˙ > S˙F /2 the
periods of aggression becomes progressively rarer and shorter. Finally, when S˙ approaches S˙F the selection
pressure on the cooperativity and the aggression between systems disappears. This kind of model can be
useful to analyse the interplay of the cooperation/competition processes that can be found in some so-
cial, economic, ecological and biochemical systems; as an illustration we refer to the competition between
drug-selling gangs.
PACS. 89.65.-s Social and economic systems – 87.23.Kg Dynamics of evolution – 87.18.-h Biological
complexity
1 Introduction
There are many situations in which the global perfor-
mance of a set of competing systems, measured in some
way, is below its maximum possible value due to compe-
tition among the systems. Generally, in complex systems
the competing components use different strategies that
may consume part of the available resources in order to
reduce the performance of the others. In these situations
there is a global cost but the collateral effect is to favor the
emergence of new strategies that tend to increase the di-
versity and complexity in these systems. This is the case in
some social and economic systems [1,2,3,4,5] and in cer-
tain ecological and biochemical systems [6,7,8,9,10]. For
example, Axelrod [1,2] considers an evolutionary approach
to social norms based on a n-person Prisoner’s dilemma.
In this game the players can defect (getting a payoff and
hurting each of the other players) but can be punished
if seen by another player. The evolution of the player’s
strategy (the boldness and the vengefulness) is driven by
the selection of the strategies giving the best scores; how-
ever, the maximum global score (no one defects) is rarely
observed.
There are several instances in which there is an inter-
play between risk and profit. In some cases, the balance
between risk and profit depends on the degree of organiza-
tion within a competing system: a greater degree of orga-
nization usually results in a greater profit but on the other
hand it may also increase potential losses in case of an ag-
gression from a competing system. Consider for instance
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the various drug-selling gangs that coexist in the poorest
neighborhoods of a large city [11,12]. The gangs compete
to sell drugs to a limited number of customers (the re-
source). The customers prefer to buy in the safest, easiest
and quickest possible way and the gangs try to sell as much
as they can by using strategies to attract the largest pos-
sible fraction of the consumers in the city. The model pre-
sented here considers two types of strategies: intra-system
cooperation and inter-system aggression. In the gangs ex-
ample, the degree of intra-gang cooperation can be asso-
ciated to the various ways in which the gang members are
grouped. The dealers can distribute themselves in as many
intersections as dealers in the gang, however busy corners
(as well as shopping centers) where several dealers oper-
ate at the same time offer an environment in which cus-
tomers can buy drugs in an easy and quick way; besides,
the presence of other customers gives the impression of a
relatively safe place, hence increasing the probability of
a successful transaction. Inter-system aggressions can be
associated with the violence between gangs. In our model
an aggression has a cost for the aggressor and causes more
damage to units working in cooperation than to isolated
units. The shooting of a rival drug-dealer immediately
stops drug sales at the crime scene. During the next days
or weeks the police is patrolling the area, scaring away ha-
bitual customers who choose to buy drugs in safer places.
If the shooting occurs in a busy corner, where several drug-
dealers operate simultaneously, income losses per shooting
are larger compared to the one-dealer one-corner case. On
the other hand, the attacking gang pays a cost in several
ways: money to buy guns and/or hire mercenary aggres-
sors, demand of dealers for higher wages because of the
added risk, etc. This particular example illustrates the
kind of competition/cooperation mechanisms considered
in this paper that are common to certain socioeconomic,
ecological, and biochemical systems. Our analysis consid-
ers these general aspects; however we will refer to the drug-
gang example in order to illustrate the relation between
our general (non specific) model and a concrete, real-world
situation.
The aim of this work is to formulate a model to anal-
yse the coevolution of the strategies of systems competing
for limited resources [13]; specifically, we study the coevo-
lution of local intra-system cooperation and global inter-
system aggression. Our model consist of Ng × Ne identi-
cal units organized in Ng systems with Ne elements per
system. This type of systems is found in cells, where en-
zymes are grouped within specialized organelles; similarly,
in the industrial sector, machines are grouped in facto-
ries, or, as in the gang example, drug dealers are grouped
in gangs. The systems compete to acquire the resources
(substrates, raw material or customers) supplied to the
system at a rate S˙ and at the same time are allowed to
produce inhibitors that reduce the performance of others.
The cooperation among associated units increases their
efficiency to acquire the resources when they are arranged
in oligomers, as in the case of enzymes [14]; the number
of units cooperating in a given configuration can be inter-
preted as a measure of its degree of organization. Aggres-
sion is modelled by the release of inhibitors, which reduce
the efficiency by blocking the unit during a period of time
as in the case of the occupation by an inhibitor of the
active site where a substrate is bound to an enzyme [14].
The performance (i.e. the production rate) of a system de-
pends on its comparative ability to acquire the resources,
which in turn depends on the configuration of the units in
the system. In absence of inhibitors, the production rate is
greater in systems where units cooperate than in systems
where units work in isolation. However, when inhibitors
are present, the number of units blocked per inhibitor de-
pends on the working configuration of the units. In this
way, the effect of an aggression will be more damaging
to systems with a greater degree of organization (greater
number of units working in cooperation).
In real systems the strategies used by its components
to survive and reproduce are in general very sophisticated
and are the result of evolution. Models like the one pre-
sented here help to understand how environmental condi-
tions and interaction between the systems drive the evo-
lution of the model parameters; in our case, the fraction
of units working in isolation and the conditions that must
be satisfied for the release of inhibitors.
The model is presented in Sec. 2, both in a continuous
as well as in a discrete version. In Sec. 3 we consider a set
of competing systems including four types of systems with
different cooperating configurations; two cases are consid-
ered: when the inhibitors are introduced by an external
source and when the inhibitors are released by the sys-
tems. In Sec. 4 a genetic algorithm is used to allow the
evolution of the systems’ strategies when the units oper-
ate either in isolation or in cooperative arrangements of
four units each. Conclusions are given in Sec. 5.
2 The model
Consider a set ofNg systems, each one with the same num-
ber Ne of units. The Ng × Ne units compete to acquire
the available resources (hereafter known as the substrate)
that are supplied at a rate S˙. Each unit can be in one of
four states: i) idle (ready to acquire either a substrate or
an inhibitor), ii) busy (processing a substrate during a pe-
riod of time τp), iii) recovering (during a period of time τr
necessary to reach the idle state after releasing a product),
or iv) inhibited (unable to acquire a substrate during a pe-
riod of time τI after acquiring an inhibitor). Therefore, the
duty cycle of a non-inhibited unit is τ = τp+τr. The units
in a system can be organized in cooperative arrangements
of µ units; such arrangements increase the efficiency of
the units to acquire either substrates or inhibitors. When
κ of the µ units in a cooperative arrangement are busy
the remaining µ − κ idle units increase their probability
to bind to a substrate (or to a inhibitor) by a factor α−κ
relative to the isolated case, where 1/α (0 < α < 1) is
the efficiency of the cooperation. If a unit is inhibited, the
other idle units in the cooperative arrangement are also
inhibited.
In the following two subsections we present a continu-
ous and a discrete version of the model. In the continuous
Jose´ M. Albornoz, Antonio Parravano: Coevolution of competing systems: local cooperation and global inhibition 3
version (Sec. 2.1) we use a mean field approach to obtain
the stationary solutions for the average state of the Ng
systems. These stationary solutions are useful to visualize
the main properties of the model, however they cannot be
used to follow the dynamics of the individual units nor to
describe the general case of inhomogeneous intra-system
cooperativity. The discrete version of the model (Sec. 2.2)
allows to follow the evolution of the state of each unit, of
each cooperative arrangement, and the production rate of
each system. It must be borne in mind that the continu-
ous model presented here does not represent all the details
contained in the discrete model; nevertheless its station-
ary solutions shed light on the essential properties of the
type of systems we want to study.
2.1 Mean Field approximation: stationary solutions
In order to show some of the basic properties of the model,
we find the stationary solutions when the internal struc-
ture of each system is described by the fraction of idle
units Fi in system i (1 ≤ i ≤ Ng). The recovering state
of each unit is neglected so that the duty cycle is τ = τp.
We approximate the total production rate G˙i of products
P plus inhibitors I in system i as
G˙i = P˙i + I˙i = NeFipiS, (1)
where S is the stationary number of substrates that can
be bound by the Ng × Ne units, NeFi is number of idle
units in system i, and
pi =
p0
α〈κ〉i
≃
p0
α(µi−1)(1−Fi)
(2)
is the probability (per unit time) that an idle unit binds
either to a substrate or to an inhibitor. In this expression
the parameter p0 is the probability (per unit substrate and
unit time) that an isolated idle unit binds to a substrate
(or to an inhibitor), α controls the degree of cooperation
between the components of a cooperative arrangement, µi
is the number of units in the cooperative arrangements of
system i, and 〈κ〉i ≃ (µi − 1)(1 − Fi) approximates the
average number of busy units in a cooperative arrange-
ment in system i. Note that the number of units µ per
cooperative arrangement is assumed to be constant in a
given system, but can differ from system to system. These
approximations are overcome in the discrete model (Sec.
2.2).
The stationary fraction of occupied units Focc,i and
inhibited units Finh,i in system i is approximated as
Focc,i = SFipiτ and Finh,i = IFipiµiτI,i. (3)
where τI,i is the time during which a cooperative arrange-
ment in system i is disabled once one of its units binds
an inhibitor, and I is the stationary number of inhibitors
available to be bound. Since F = 1 − Focc − Finh, the
equation
1− Fi
Fi
α(µi−1)(1−Fi)
p0
= Sτ + IµiτI,i (4)
provides Fi as a function of S, I, and the model parame-
ters α, p0, µi, τi, and τI,i. In stationary conditions
S =
S˙
Ne
∑
piFi
(5)
and
I =
∑
I˙i
Ne
∑
piFi
. (6)
Finally, the rate of inhibitor production is assumed
to depend on the total production rate G˙i = P˙i + I˙i as
shown in Fig. 1. Inhibitors are produced only when the
production rate is in the range P˙cri,i/2 < P˙i < P˙cri,i,
where P˙cri,i is the critical production rate below which
system i releases inhibitors. Since an aggression has an
associated cost, a system must achieve a minimum per-
formance level in order to release an inhibitor; therefore
inhibitors will not be released if P˙i < P˙cri,i/2. Within the
P˙cri,i/2 < P˙i < P˙cri,i range the rate of inhibitor produc-
tion is proportional to P˙ ; that is, I˙ = βP˙ . Note that: i) In
the range P˙cri,i/2 < G˙i < (1 + β)P˙cri,i/2 the production
rate is regulated to the value P˙i = P˙cri,i/2; that is, within
this range any change in S˙ will produce a change in I˙i, but
not in P˙i. ii) In the range P˙cri,i < G˙i < (1 + β)P˙cri,i the
system adopts one of two distinct regimes: one in which
P˙i = G˙i and I˙i = 0, and the other in which P˙i = G˙i/(1+β)
and I˙i = G˙i β/(1 + β). These two regimes result in a hys-
teresis behavior, as follows: a) starting in the upper branch
and decreasing S˙, no inhibitors are produced until the pro-
duction rate reaches the critical value P˙cri,i, b) starting in
the lower branch and increasing S˙, the system produces
inhibitors until the production rate reaches the critical
value (1 + β) P˙cri,i.
We are now interested in the stationary solutions P˙i(S˙)
and I˙i(S˙). An iterative procedure is employed to obtain
them: starting with an initial guess value for I, the value
of Fi in each system is obtained through eqs. (4) and (5),
while G˙i is obtained by using eq. (1); then function G˙i(P˙i)
is used to obtain new values for I˙i. Equation (6) is used
to obtain a new value of I, and the procedure is repeated
until convergence is achieved. To deal with the bi-valued
region of G˙i(P˙i) the procedure is repeated considering all
possible combinations of the systems’ behavior (i.e. the
inhibitor production being ON or OFF in the bi-valued
region).
Figure 2 shows the equilibrium solutions in the plane
[P˙ /S˙, S˙] for two systems, labeled A and B. For the cho-
sen parameter values, the production regulated regimes of
the two systems partially overlap, as well as the bi-valued
regimes. Note that all possible combinations occur: the
symbol A↑ (A↓) indicates that system A is producing (not
producing) inhibitors. Even two identical systems (for in-
stance, the case considered in Fig. 2 but with µA = µB
and P˙cri,A = P˙cri,B) can display heterogeneous behavior
in the range P˙cri < G˙ < (1+β)P˙cri. In this range two ho-
mogeneous (A↑&B↑ and A↓&B↓) and two inhomogeneous
(A↑&B↓ and A↓&B↑) solutions can be distinguished in
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Fig. 1. The production rate P˙i as function of the total rate
production G˙i = P˙i + I˙i. The inhibitor production is I˙i = βP˙i
for P˙cri,i/2 < P˙i < P˙cri,i, whereas I˙i = 0 for P˙i < P˙cri,i/2 and
P˙i > P˙cri,i. For P˙cri,i/2 < G˙i < (1+β)P˙cri,i/2 the production
rate is regulated to the value P˙cri,i/2 and the inhibitor produc-
tion is I˙i = G˙i−P˙cri,i/2. In the range P˙cri,i < G˙i < (1+β)P˙cri,i
the inhibitor production is bi-valued.
Fig. 2. This behavior is a consequence of the hysteresis
in G˙i(P˙i), which in turn is characteristic of real systems
with competition, cooperation, and aggression: once a con-
flict arises it tends to persist over time, and a substantial
change in the conditions is required to extinguish it [16].
We now focus in a particular case in which system A
is constituted by single, non cooperative units (i.e. µA =
1) with the capacity to produce inhibitors (I˙A = βP˙A),
whereas system B is composed by cooperative arrange-
ments (i.e. µB > 1) that never produce inhibitors (I˙B =
0). In this case, the fraction of idle units in the systems
satisfy the equations
1− FA
FA
=
S˙
Neσ
[τ +
τI FA β
σ(1 + β)
], (7)
and
1− FB
FB
α(µB−1)(1−FB) =
S˙
Neσ
[τ +
µB τI FA β
σ(1 + β)
], (8)
where
σ = FA +
FB
α(µB−1)(1−FB)
. (9)
FA and FB can be obtained by solving eqs. (7) and (8)
for given parameters S˙, β, α, µB , τ and τI . The production
rates are then given by
P˙A =
S˙ FA
σ(1 + β)
and P˙B =
S˙ FB
σ α(µB−1)(1−FB)
. (10)
System A always uses a fraction β of the processed sub-
strate to release inhibitors (thus reducing its production
Fig. 2. Normalized total production rate P˙ /S˙ = (P˙A+ P˙B)/S˙
as a function of the supply rate of substrate S˙ for two systems
labeled A and B. The two systems are identical, except for the
size of cooperative arrangements µ and the critical production
rate P˙cri, which are are greater in system B. The parameter
values are β = 0.2, p0 = 0.1, α = 0.5, τA = τB = 1, τI,A =
τI,B = 5, µA = 1, µB = 2, P˙cri,A = 0.6, and P˙cri,B = 0.7.
efficiency), whereas system B converts all the processed
substrate into products. Moreover, the idle units in sys-
tem B are more efficient at acquiring substrates (µB > 1
and α < 1) than the idle units in systen A (µA = 1),
and therefore FB < FA always. However, system B is also
more efficient binding inhibitors and additionally µB (> 1)
units are blocked per bound inhibitor. Therefore, there is
a critical value of S˙ for which the fraction of blocked units
in system B is large enough to reduce its production rate
below that of system A. Figure 3 shows the normalized
critical value S˙c(µB)/Ne of the substrate supply rate at
which the production rates of the two systems are the
same (i.e. P˙A = P˙B = S˙/(2 + β)). For S˙ > S˙c the pro-
duction rate of system A is larger than that of system B.
For low values of µB the condition P˙A = P˙B is reached
for high values of S˙, and therefore, low values of FB . For
FB ≪ 1, eqs. (7-10) give
S˙c
Ne
≈
2 + β
τ + µB
τIβ
2+β
. (11)
For larger values of µB, the critical value S˙c must be ob-
tained numerically. As shown in Fig. 3, S˙c decreases as
µB, β or τI increase or α increases.
In order to illustrate how the distribution of perfor-
mances changes when inhibitors are released, we now per-
form a comparison between the previous case and a case
where none of the systems release inhibitors. Fig. 4 shows
the normalized production rates P˙A and P˙B as a func-
tion of S˙/Ne when system A converts a fraction β of its
production into inhibitors (A↑&B↓, continuous curves), as
well as the production rates P˙A,0 and P˙B,0 when none of
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Fig. 3. The normalized critical value S˙c/Ne of the substrate
input rate at which P˙A = P˙B when system A converts a frac-
tion β of its products into inhibitors and its units do not co-
operate (i.e. µA = 1). For substrate supply rates greater than
S˙c the production rate of system A is larger than that of sys-
tem B. The continuous curve corresponds to parameter values
β = 0.2, p0 = 0.1, α = 0.5, τA = τB = 1, τI,A = τI,B = 5 and
µA = 1. The dashed curves shows the effect of varying β, τI or
α.
the systems produce inhibitors (A↓&B↓, dashed curves).
Note that depending on the value of S˙, the production of
inhibitors by system A can increase the production of sys-
tem B (S˙ < S˙B), can increase the production of system
A (S˙ > S˙A), can decrease the ratio P˙B/P˙A of the systems
production (S˙ > S˙R), or can make the production of sys-
tem A larger than that of system B (S˙ > S˙c). For the case
shown in Fig. 4, S˙A = 0.62, S˙B = 0.53, S˙R = 0.59, and
S˙c = 0.74. These values depend on the model parameters:
for example, if α = 0.75 and β = 0.2 then S˙A = 0.60,
S˙B = 0.11, S˙R = 0.46, and S˙c = 0.61, whereas, if α = 0.5
and β = 0.1 then S˙A = 0.75, S˙B = 0.64, S˙R = 0.72, and
S˙c = 1.03.
The stationary solutions obtained above show that our
choice of mechanisms leads to a model that displays some
of the distinctive behaviors of a set of systems in compe-
tition for a resource, where each system has the possibil-
ity to increase its efficiency by intra-system cooperation
and/or to to reduce the performance of its competitors by
investing part of its profits to inflict aggression. That is,
i) Diversity: Even in the case of identical systems there
are stable inhomogeneous solutions. ii) Hysteresis: in the
bi-valuated region, a system steadily producing inhibitors
needs large perturbations to leave this regime and vicev-
ersa. iii) Aggression may give comparative advantages:
when one or more systems are producing inhibitors, the
total production is always below the maximum possible
value. However, the distribution of profits can change in
such a way that a system producing inhibitors can increase
Fig. 4. Normalized production rates of systems A and B.
The continuous curves correspond to the case when system A
produces inhibitors (βA = 0.2). The dashed curves correspond
to the case when there is no inhibitor production. In the two
cases p0 = 0.1, α = 0.5, τA = τB = 1, τI,A = τI,B = 5,
µA = 1 and µB = 4. The four vertical dashed lines indicate
the values S˙A, S˙B , S˙R, and S˙c at which P˙A = P˙A,0, P˙B = P˙B,0,
P˙B,0/P˙A,0 = P˙B/P˙A, and P˙A = P˙B , respectively.
its production and, even more, can increase its ranking in
the systems’ performance distribution. This comparative
advantage is relevant when the production ranking among
the systems determines the chances for survival and repro-
duction.
Note that if we add a third system C, composed by
non-cooperative units (µC = 1 as system A) that never
releases inhibitors (I˙C = 0 as system B), it will always per-
form better than system A. This kind of “opportunism”
is relevant for the coevolution of the system parameters
under selection pressure studied in Sec. 4.
2.2 Discrete non stationary model
We now consider a discrete non stationary model that
avoids several approximations adopted in the Mean Field
stationary model described in Sec. 2.1. Specifically: 1) In
the discrete model the systems can have an inhomoge-
neous internal structure; i.e. a system can be composed
of cooperative arrangements of various sizes. 2) The state
of each unit, and therefore the state of its neighbors in a
cooperative arrangement, is known at any time. This is
a relevant difference with respect to the Mean Field sta-
tionary model because the probability of an idle unit in a
cooperative arrangement binding to a substrate depends
on the number of busy neighbors in the arrangement: once
any idle unit binds to a substrate, the other units in the ar-
rangement increase their probability to bind to substrates;
therefore some cooperative arrangement tend to be fully
busy while others remain fully idle. In contrast, in the
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mean field approximation the mean number of busy units
〈κ〉 was approximated as (µ− 1)(1−F ). This approxima-
tion neglects the fact that the inhibition of a cooperative
arrangement decreases F but does not increase the proba-
bility of an idle unit binding to a substrate. 3) Substrates,
products and inhibitors are discrete. 4) A system fulfilling
the conditions to release inhibitors at a given time can
convert a product into an inhibitor only if a product was
produced at that time.
As in the Mean Field stationary model, there is a set
of Ng systems, each one possesing the same number Ne
of units, and the Ng × Ne units compete to acquire the
available resources that are supplied at a rate S˙. However,
now the state of each unit is characterized by an integer
phase variable φi,j(t) where 1 ≤ i ≤ Ng indicates the
system, 1 ≤ j ≤ Ne enumerates the units in the system,
and t is a discrete time counter. The phase of unit (i, j)
evolves in a similar way as the phase of the stochastic
automata originally proposed by Mikhailov and Hess [17,
18,19,20], but allowing for two additional processes: (i)
the unit can bind either to a substrate or to an inhibitor
and (ii) units can work in cooperation with other units,
thus modifying their ability to bind to a substrate or to an
inhibitor. The idle state corresponds to the phase φ = 0,
where the unit is ready to acquire either a substrate or an
inhibitor. When the unit acquires a substrate the phase
changes to φ = 1; afterwards the phase value is increased
in each time step until the unit reaches the maximum
phase value φ = τ ; once this happens the unit returns to
its original idle state φ = 0. A product is released at a fixed
phase 1 < τp < τ . When the unit acquires an inhibitor the
phase changes from φ = 0 to the negative value φ = −τI ;
afterwards the phase value is increased by one unit in each
time step until the unit reaches its idle state φ = 0. The
algorithm to iterate the phase of unit (i, j) is then
φi,j(t+ 1) =

φi,j(t) + 1 if φi,j(t) 6= 0,
0 if φi,j(t) = τ
1 if φi,j(t) = 0 with probability pi,j,
−τI if φi,j(t) = 0 with probability qi,j,
0 if φi,j(t) = 0 with probability 1− pi,j − qi,j.
(12)
The probabilities pi,j and qi,j are given by
pi,j = p0NS/α
κi,j and qi,j = p0NI/α
κi,j . (13)
During a single iteration t the number of substrates NS
and inhibitors NI changes as they are bound by idle units.
In Eq. (13) the parameter p0 represents the probability
that an isolated idle unit binds either to a substrate or
to an inhibitor when only one substrate or one inhibitor
is available to be bound. The parameter α > 0 controls
the degree of cooperation between units and the expo-
nent κi,j is the number of busy units that cooperate with
unit j in system i. When all the units in a cooperative
arrangement are in their idle state, κi,j = 0 and therefore
there is no cooperation; that is, the probability to bind
to a substrate is the same as if the units were working
in isolation. When κi,j units in a cooperative structure
are busy (1 ≤ φ ≤ τ) the probabilities pi,j and qi,j of
the idle units in the structure are increased (if α < 1)
or decreased (if α > 1) by a factor α−κi,j relative to the
isolated case (κi,j = 0 or α = 1). When an unit binds an
inhibitor, it remains inoperative during τI iterations. If an
unit is in its inhibited phase (−τI ≤ φ ≤ 0) the binding
probabilities are pi,j = qi,j = 0 for the idle units that co-
operate with the inhibited unit; however the cooperating
units that were processing a substrate continue normally
their way towards the idle state. In the following we adopt
α < 1.
The configuration of the cooperative units in a system
remains fixed during the simulation; that is, if the units
j and j + 1 of system i are set as a cooperative arrange-
ment these two units remain in cooperation during the
complete simulation of one generation. For system i the
configuration is characterized by the three parametersMi,
Di, and Ti giving, respectively, the number of units work-
ing in isolation (Monomers), the number of cooperating
arrangements of two units (Dimers), and the number of
arrangements of four units (Tetramers); all possible con-
figurations satisfy Mi + 2Di + 4Ti = Ne.
At the beginning of a given iteration S˙ substrates are
added and the following procedure is executed: (a) the
phases of the busy and the inhibited units are increased
by one step. (b) an unit (i, j) is selected at random among
those in their idle state provided it is not associated to
an inhibited unit in a cooperative arrangement; (c) the
selected unit starts its processing cycle with probability
pi,j , is inhibited with probability qi,j , or remains idle with
probability 1− pi,j − qi,j . If the unit starts its processing
cycle the number of substrates NS decreases by one unit.
If an inhibitor is bound, the total number of inhibitors
NI decreases in one unit. If the unit (i, j) does not leave
the idle state, it is not selected again during the present
iteration. Steps (b) and (c) are repeated until NS+NI = 0,
or until all the units that were idle at the beginning of the
iteration t are selected.
The number of products released in a given iteration
t by the Ne units in system i is denoted as P˙i(t) and
the total production rate as P˙ =
∑Ng
1 P˙i. The mean pro-
duction rate per unit and per duty cycle in system i is
denoted as υi = τP˙i/Ne. υi is a measure of the perfor-
mance of system i, which in turn depends on the par-
ticular configuration of the units within the system. The
corresponding mean production rate for all systems is υ =
(1/Ng)
∑Ng
1 υi = τP˙ /NeNg. Since the maximum produc-
tion rate is P˙ = NeNg/τ , then 0 ≤ υ ≤ 1. In absence of
inhibitors, the maximum production is approached when
the binding probability is p ≫ 1/τ . If NeNg > τ S˙ then,
the fraction of units in their idle state is ∼ 1−τ S˙/(NeNg)
and in average P˙ = S˙. However, if the configuration of
cooperating arrangements in the Ng systems is inhomoge-
neous, then the distribution of the production rates P˙i is
also inhomogeneous.
The inhibitors can be introduced by an external source
at a rate I˙ext(t) or can be released into the environment by
some systems at a rate I˙i(t). In Secs. 3 and 4 we describe
the conditions a system must fulfill to release an inhibitor.
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3 Inhomogeneous configurations
Consider a set of Ng = 20 systems, each one consisting on
Ne = 120 units arranged in different cooperative configu-
rations:Mi = Ne for 1 ≤ i ≤ 5; Di = Ne/2 for 6 ≤ i ≤ 10;
Ti = Ne/4 for 11 ≤ i ≤ 15; and Mi = 40, Di = 20, and
Ti = 10 for 16 ≤ i ≤ 20. To quantify the performance
of the ith system we evaluate the average production rate
〈υi〉 per unit and per duty cycle τ in system i. Let us label
these four types of systems as types M, D, T and MDT
and their corresponding production rates as 〈υ〉M , 〈υ〉D,
〈υ〉T and 〈υ〉MDT .
3.1 External release of inhibitors
First we consider the case when the set of systems is sup-
plied with a constant rate S˙ of substrates and analyse the
dependence of 〈υ〉M , 〈υ〉D, 〈υ〉T and 〈υ〉MDT on the ex-
ternal rate of release of inhibitors I˙ext. The objective of
this analysis is to determine how the degree of organiza-
tion within each system determines its performance in the
presence of increasing levels of aggression.
When S˙ = 12NeNg/τ there are enough substrates to
maintain half of the units busy; this corresponds to a pro-
duction rate 〈υ〉 = 1/2. The average number of free sub-
strates depends on p0 and on the number of cooperative
arrangements in the system. If p0 = 1/τ and NS = 1,
an isolated unit remains in average half of the time in
its idle state. If p0 is reduced, NS must be increased in
the same proportion in order to maintain the units work-
ing at half velocity. If not all the units work in isolation,
the units in cooperative arrangements will be busier than
the isolated ones (for α < 1). Therefore, in absence of
inhibitors one expects 〈υ〉T > 〈υ〉D > 〈υ〉M , but these
relations change depending on the rate of release of in-
hibitors I˙ext and on the blocking time τI . The results in
Fig. 5 correspond to the case when S˙ = 12NeNg/τ . As
I˙ext increases, the performance of the T-systems decreases
whereas for the M-systems it increases: the higher impact
of inhibition on the T-systems means that there are less
highly-organized units competing for the resource, thereby
increasing its availability for the rest of the systems. Fol-
lowing the drug-gang analogy, this means that shootings
taking place in busy corners where several dealers operate
at the same time force the customers to move to other lo-
cations where smaller groups of dealers operate, improving
the profits of these dealers. However, for I˙ext ≥ 1.2 even
the performance of the M-systems decreases because more
than half of the units are blocked (i.e. τI I˙ext µ ≥
1
2NgNe,
where µ ≃ 2 is the mean number of units in cooperat-
ing arrangements). This result illustrates how the perfor-
mance of all systems will be negatively affected regardless
of their degree of organization for sufficiently high levels
of aggression. Note that the performance of the MDT sys-
tems remains almost constant for I˙ext < 1.2. Therefore, at
least up to a certain intensity of aggression, diversification
in the degree of organization is a robust strategy against
aggression.
Fig. 5. The average production rate 〈υ〉 per unit and per duty
cycle τ for the four types of systems M, D, T and MDT (see
text) as a function of the external rate of release of inhibitors
I˙ext. The adopted parameters are Ne = 120, τ = 100, τI = 5τ ,
p0 = 1/τ and α = 1/4. The substrate supply rate is kept fixed
to S˙ = 12. A simulation for 200 τ was performed for each value
of I˙ext.
Fig. 6. The average production rates for the four types of
systems M, D, T and MDT as a function of the nonbelligerent
period τnon for < 〈I˙ext〉 = 1. Model parameters as in Fig. 5.
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In order to examine the effect of a non-stationary in-
hibitor release rate, Fig. 6 shows the average production
rates 〈υ〉M , 〈υ〉D, 〈υ〉T and 〈υ〉MDT as a function of the
nonbelligerent period τnon. The inhibitor release rate is
I˙ext = 0 during τnon − 1 iterations and in the next iter-
ation the release rate is I˙non = τnon; that is, the average
inhibitor release rate is 〈I˙ext〉 = 1. In order to reduce syn-
chronization effects the inhibition time was randomized
10% around its mean value τI = 5τ . The results show
how the sudden onset of aggression affects the systems:
those with a greater degree of organization have a better
performance as the nonbelligerent period grows longer due
to their greater efficiency. Note that as τnon increases the
average production rates tend to the values correspond-
ing to I˙ext = 0. When a large number of inhibitors are
added in a single iteration (τnon ≫ 1) many idle units
in all cooperating arrangements are blocked, and there-
fore all types of systems reduce their performances during
τI iterations. The performance of the MDT systems re-
mains almost constant for a wide range of values of τnon,
illustrating once again the robustness of the systems with
diverse degrees of organization.
3.2 Internal release of inhibitors
Consider the case in which inhibitors are produced under
certain conditions and at a given cost by the systems. We
assume that at a given time an inhibitor is released into
the environment by system i if the following conditions are
fulfilled: (i) at least one of the units in system i has re-
leased a product during the present iteration t; (ii) there
are no free inhibitors; and (iii) υcri > υi(t) > υcri/2,
where υi is the system production averaged during the
previous τave iterations and υcri is the critical average
production rate below which a system will release an in-
hibitor. Since an aggression has an associated cost, a sys-
tem must achieve a minimum level of performance in or-
der to release an inhibitor; therefore, as in the case of
the continuous Mean Field model, an inhibitor will not
be released if υi(t) < υcri/2. The cost of producing an
inhibitor is one product. During a given iteration a given
system may release more than one inhibitor, but in gen-
eral, conditions (i) and (ii) limit the release of inhibitors
to at most to one per iteration. This corresponds to low
intensity conflicts in the drug-gang example. Continuing
with this analogy, an aggression takes place once the prof-
its of a particular gang fall below a given critical value,
however if the profits are too low the gang will not be able
to afford an aggression.
Fig. 7 shows the average production rates 〈υi〉 as func-
tion of υcri for 20 systems competing to acquire the sub-
strates supplied at a constant rate S˙ = 12NeNg/τ . Half
of the systems (black lines) have their units (Ne = 120)
working in isolation (M-systems) and the other half (grey
lines) have their units working in cooperative arrange-
ments of four units (T-systems). The curve labelled υtot
corresponds to all-systems average production per unit
and the curve labelled σ(υtot) gives its standard devia-
tion. In the region in between the diagonal dashed lines the
Fig. 7. The average production rate 〈υi〉 of the 20 competing
systems as a function of the critical averaged production υcri
(see text). The model parameters are the same as in Fig. 5
and τave = 10 τ . Half of the systems (black curves) have their
units working in isolation (M-systems) and the other half (grey
curves) have their units working in cooperative arrangements
of four units (T-systems). The curve labelled υtot corresponds
to the total average production and the curve labelled σ(υtot)
to its standard deviation. In the region in between the two
diagonal dashed lines the condition (iii) is fullfilled. The Roman
numbers label the 5 different regimes displayed by the systems.
condition (iii) is fullfilled. The Roman numbers label the
5 different regimes observed in Fig. 7. In regime (I) none
of the system production falls in the range [υcri/2, υcri]
and therefore there is no inhibitor production; the co-
operation in T-systems results in a better performance
than in M-systems. In regime (II) a few M-systems re-
leasing inhibitors (in fact, only one in Fig. 3) are able
to substantially reduce the production of T-systems and
to increase the production of the remaining non belliger-
ent M-systems; however, T-systems perform better than
M-systems. Note that the system is self-regulated to man-
tain the production of the attacking system k close to
υk = υcri/2. This is an interesting instance of emergent
cooperation: when the value of υcri is modest, some of the
less organized systems keep their performance just above
υcri/2, negatively affecting the performance of those sys-
tems with a greater degree of organization and thereby
improving the availability of substrate for the rest of their
non-belligerent, less-organized peers. In regime (III) all T-
systems release inhibitors. The performance of T-systems
is reduced because of the cost of producing inhibitors and
the blocking of their cooperating units. In this regime the
M-systems perform the best, but the all-systems average
production υsys is reduced by about 10 %. In regime (IV)
all M-systems release inhibitors and their performance is
higher than that of T-systems; the disadvantage associ-
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ated to the cost of releasing inhibitors is over-compensated
by the fact that an inhibitor is able to block four units
in the T-systems. As in regime (III), the all-system pro-
duction υsys is reduced by about 10%. In regime (V) the
T-systems sporadically release inhibitors in such a way
that their averaged production rates 〈υi〉 remains close but
below υcri/2 (note that during the simulation υi fluctu-
ates around 〈υi〉 and sporadically υcri > υi(t) > υcri/2).
These results suggest that full-scale, one-sided aggression
is profitable only for less-organized systems, as illustrated
by regime (IV): regime (III) shows that full-blown aggres-
sion from T-systems has a detrimental effect in their own
performance.
4 Evolution of system parameters
The behavior of the set of systems depends on the arrange-
ment of the units in each system and on the particular
conditions at which each system releases inhibitors. The
results in Fig. 7 show that small changes in the system
parameters can drastically change the distribution of per-
formances. In Fig. 7 we considered that the conditions to
release inhibitors were the same for all systems and that
half of the systems were homogeneous M-systems and the
other half homogeneous T-systems. Now we allow hetero-
geneity in both parameters; that is, systems are charac-
terized by the parameters (f iM ,υ
i
cri), where the monomer
fraction f iM is the fraction of the units working in isolation
in system i (the rest works in cooperative arrangements of
four units), and υicri is the value of the average production
rate below which system i may release inhibitors. Note
that in Fig. 7 we used the condition υcri > υi(t) > υcri/2
for the release of inhibitors, but now we use υi(t) < υ
i
cri.
For a given set of system parameters (f iM ,υ
i
cri) there is a
distribution of the performances 〈υi〉 in a simulation. A
change of the parameters f iM or υ
i
cri in one of the systems
generally results in a redistribution of the performances
〈υi〉 and in a change of the all-systems performance υtot.
A genetic algorithm is implemented to analyse the co-
evolution of the system parameters (f iM ,υ
i
cri) with 0 ≤
f iM ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ υ
i
cri ≤ 1. The chromosome of each sys-
tem is a eight digit binary number; the first four digits
give the 16 possible values of the momomer fraction f iM
(= 0, 1/15, 2/15, . . .15/15) and the last four digits give
the critical average production rate υicri below which the
system may release inhibitors. For the first generation the
parameters (f iM ,υ
i
cri) are chosen at random, while the pa-
rameters Ng, Ne, τ , τI , τave, α and the substrate supply
rate S˙ remain fixed for all generations. Each generation
consists of tsim iterations of the model. At the end of a gen-
eration simulation the parameters (f iM ,υ
i
cri) for the next
generation (offspring) are set by the following procedure:
(i) the performances 〈υi〉 of the Ng systems are ranked in
decreasing order. (ii) those systems whose performances
are more than one standard deviation above 〈υtot〉 have
two offspring and the rest (in decreasing order of perfor-
mance) have one offspring until the population size Ng is
reached. Note that all systems have an offspring unless one
or more systems have performances which are more than
one standard deviation above 〈υtot〉. (iii) Crossover be-
tween a random pair of offspring chromosomes occurs with
a probability pcross, and offspring mutate with a proba-
bility pmutate by changing one of their chromosome digits.
The system with the best performance is always repro-
duced without any change.
Figure 8 shows the results for three different values of
the substrate supply rate (S˙ = 1/3, 1/2 and 2/3 of the full
occupation value S˙F = NeNg/τ). In each case the evolu-
tion for 1500 generations is shown. The thick continuous
curve shows the evolution of the mean monomer fraction
fM =
∑
f iM/Ng of the population, the dotted curve with
large fluctuations shows the monomer fraction of the sys-
tem with performance ranked at half way (fM )med, the
dots indicate the monomer fraction of the systems that
have released inhibitors during the simulation of a gen-
eration, and the almost horizontal thin curve gives the
all-systems average production υtot. As S˙ increases (from
top to bottom in Fig. 8) the average monomer fraction
over generations fM decreases, the fluctuations of the
monomer fraction of the half ranked system (fM )med de-
crease, and the number of systems releasing inhibitors de-
creases. Figure 9 shows, for four particular generations,
the distribution of the parameters f iM and υ
i
cri for the 20
systems. Note the diversity of system parameters values
in all cases. The distribution of parameters values remains
relatively stable for low and high values of S˙ (see the top
and bottom panels in Fig. 8 and the two top panels of
Fig. 9) but for intermediate values of S˙ the distribution of
the system parameters values displays two very different
distributions (see the center panel in Fig. 8 and the two
botton panels of Fig. 9).
Under conditions of substrate scarcity (S˙ = 6) most
of the systems have a large fraction of their units oper-
ating in isolation, as the intensity of the aggressions (as
reflected by the number of systems releasing inhibitors
in the top panel of Fig. 8) makes collaborative arrays an
ill-advised strategy. Note that the best performing sys-
tems in the upper-left panel of Fig. 9 have high momomer
fractions and a low aggression threshold υicri. When the
substrate supply is relatively abundant (S˙ = 18) there
are few systems releasing inhibitors in each generation,
and most of the systems have a large fraction of their
units operating in tetrameric configurations; the upper-
right panel of Fig. 9 shows that that the best performers
are indeed those systems with a low monomer fraction.
When the substrate supply is halfway between abundance
and scarcity (S˙ = 12), two quasistable behaviors are ob-
served, as reflected in the central panel of Fig. 8 and the
two bottom panels of Fig. 9: the systems switch between
periods of frequent inhibitor release (aggression periods)
and high fM values, to periods where few inhibitors are
released (calm periods) together with low fM values (note
that (fM )med = 0 for many generations in these quiet pe-
riods).
In order to examine the general trends as S˙ is in-
creased, we performed 5 simulations of 1500 generations
for 24 different values of S˙ (i.e. S˙ = 1, 2, ..., 24); the first
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Fig. 8. Evolution of the monomer fraction of the population during 1500 generations for the three labelled values of the substrate
supply S˙. The thick continuous curve shows the evolution of the monomer fraction fM =
∑
f iM/Ng of the population, the dotted
curve with large fluctuations shows the monomer fraction of the system with performance ranked at half way (fM )med, the
dots indicate the monomer fraction of the systems that have released inhibitors during the simulation of a generation, and the
almost horizontal thin curve shows the total average production υtot. The model parameters are Ng = 20, Ne = 120, τ = 100,
τI = 6 τ , τave = 10 τ , p0 = 1/τ , α = 1/4, pcross = 0.05, and pmutate = 0.01.
100 generations are discarded as well as the first 30τ itera-
tions in each generation. Figure 10 shows the average rate
of release of inhibitors per iteration and per system 〈I˙〉 as
a function of the substrate supply rate S˙. Figure 11 shows
the average monomer fraction in the five simulations, also
as a function of the substrate supply rate S˙: the continu-
ous curve with error bars corresponds to the average fM
of the mean monomer fraction fM of the population, the
long-dash curve (fM,top5 vs S˙) corresponds to the same
average but taking into account only the five systems with
best performances in each generation, while the short-dash
curve (fM,bot5 vs S˙) corresponds to the average for the five
systems with the worst performances in each generation.
Figure 12 shows the average 〈υcri〉 of υcri =
∑
υicri/Ng for
each of the 24 substrate supply rate values: the long-dash
curve (〈υcri,top5〉) and the short-dash curve (〈υcri,bot5〉)
give respectively the corresponding averages for the five
systems with best and worst performances, while the grey
diagonal line represents the maximum average production
rate per unit and per cycle P˙max = S˙τ/NeNg. The error
bars in Figs. 10, 11, and 12 correspond to one standard
deviation.
It can be observed in Fig. 11 that for S˙ < 2 the
best performers are those systems with a relatively low
monomer fraction (∼ 20%). In this situation there are
many idle units, and the released inhibitors are not able to
reduce the already low system performance because their
number is not enough to block a significant fraction of
tetramers. Even when many systems release inhibitors in
small quantities (〈υcri〉 > P˙max = S˙τ/NeNg, Fig. 12),
tetrameric configurations are the best strategy to compete
for the few available substrates. This type of behavior is
also evident in Fig. 4 for S˙ < S˙C : in this range, the per-
formance of system B is greater than the performance of
system A in spite of the release of inhibitors. For com-
parison purposes one can assume Ng = 2, Ne = 10 and
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Fig. 9. Distribution of the parameters f iM and υ
i
cri for the 20
systems in four particular generations. The bottom-left panel
corresponds to generation 850 and the rest of the panels to
generation 1000. The labels indicate the value of S˙. The size
of the square representing each system is proportional to its
ranking in the performance distribution, the larger corresponds
to the best performer. The vertical line associated to some of
the squares indicates that the system has released inhibitors
during the simulation of this particular generation; the size of
the line is proportional to the amount of inhibitors released.
Fig. 10. The average inhibitor release rate 〈I˙〉 by the set of
systems for the last 1400 generations in 5 simulations as a func-
tion of the substrate supply rate S˙. The error bars correspond
to one standard deviation. Model parameters as in Fig. 8.
Fig. 11. The average 〈fM 〉 of the mean monomer fraction fM
of the population for the last 1400 generations in 5 simulations
as a function of the substrate supply rate S˙. The long-dash
(fM,top5 vs S˙) and the short-dash (fM,bot5 vs S˙) curves show
respectively the corresponding averages for the five systems
with best and worst performances in each generation. The error
bars correspond to one standard deviation. Model parameters
as in Fig. 8.
τ = 1, so that the full occupation value is S˙ = 20 in that
particular case.
For 3 < S˙ < 9 a broad turnover is observed in 〈I˙〉 and
〈fM 〉. In this range the worst performers release inhibitors
since 〈υcri,bot5〉 is greater than the maximum average pro-
duction P˙max and fM ≈ fM,bot5. The best performers do
not release inhibitors (see the top-left panel in Fig. 9); be-
sides, they have the largest fM and the lowest υcri values.
Occasionally, some of the best performers are one standard
deviation above the mean performance value; nonetheless,
most of the worst performers are reproduced in the next
generation. Therefore, in this range most of the systems
tend to have a relatively high monomer fraction, with
a significant fraction of the systems releasing inhibitors.
Returning to the drug-gang analogy, when customers are
relatively scarce most of the gangs members will operate
in solitary, since a greater level of organization would in-
crease their vulnerability; at the same time the gang prof-
its will be reduced both by the use of a less efficient level
of organization and by the cost of the aggressions as they
battle for customers.
Over S˙ ≃ 9 most systems have υicri < P˙max, thus
the number of systems releasing inhibitors decreases as
S˙ increases, as can be noted in the sharp decline in Fig.
10; therefore, the average monomer fraction fM also de-
creases. Note that the largest values of the dispersion of
fM occurs around S˙ = 12, in agreement with what is ob-
served in the middle panel of Fig. 8. This high dispersion
results from the fact that the system has two quasistable
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Fig. 12. The average 〈υcri〉 of υcri =
∑
υicri/Ng in the 5×1400
generations as a function of the substrate supply rate S˙. The
long-dash (〈υcri,top5〉) and the short-dash (〈υcri,bot5〉) curves
show respectively the corresponding averages for the five sys-
tems with best and worst performances in each generation. The
grey diagonal line indicates the maximum average production
rate per unit and per cycle P˙max = S˙τ/NeNg . The error bars
correspond to one standard deviation. Model parameters as in
Fig. 8.
states: one of high monomeric fraction and high inhibitor
production (see bottom-left panel in Fig. 9) , and other of
low monomeric fraction and low inhibitor production (see
bottom-right panel in Fig. 9). In the drug-selling gangs
example, this situation corresponds to extended periods
of relative calm, followed by periods of frequent aggres-
sions. For sufficiently high values of S˙ the best performers
are those systems with a low monomer fraction, showing
that when substrate is abundant, inhibitor release is not
important and that most of the systems operate using
tetrameric configurations (see top-right panel in Fig. 9).
Finally, the selection pressure on the cooperativity and ag-
gression of systems disappears when the substrate supply
rate approaches the full occupation rate S˙F = NeNg/τ .
The results shown correspond to a particular choice of
model parameters, rules to generate offspring, conditions
to release inhibitors, etc. Nevertheless, these results show
that the interplay between cooperative configurations and
the possibility to decrease the production of others by the
release of inhibitors gives rise to a rich variety of behaviors
that are reminiscent of some behaviors observed in real
systems that compete for a limited amount of resources. In
particular, the model shows that this kind of systems tends
to display global evolutive transition when the supply of
resources lies in between abundance and scarcity.
5 Summary and Conclusions
We have proposed a model to study the combined effect
of competition, cooperation and aggression. The model
consists of a set of systems, each one having a number of
units that can work with various degrees of organization.
The systems compete to acquire the available resources
and can attack other systems through the release of in-
hibitors.
We first considered a Mean Field stationary model
in order to examine the main properties of this kind of
systems. In particular, this model shows the existence of
inhomogeneous solutions (diversity) with the presence of
hysteresis. The model also shows how the distribution of
performances depends on the degree of organization and
the aggression level in the systems. We then introduced a
discrete model that allows to follow the state of each unit
in each system. The discrete model is first applied to the
case where four types of systems are interacting: M, D,
T and MDT-systems, where M, D, and T refer to units
working as Monomers, Dimers and Tetramers. We have
analyzed the production of these four types of coexisting
systems as a function of the rate at which inhibitors are
released, in order to examine how the degree of organi-
zation within each system determines its performance in
the presence of aggression and competition. If the release
rate of inhibitors is stationary, the T-systems dominate
the consumption of the available resources for low release
rates whereas at high release rates the M-systems domi-
nate the consumption; however, the performance of every
system will be degraded regardless of their degree or orga-
nization if the inhibitor release rate is sufficiently intense.
Systems with a mixture of degrees of organization exhib-
ited robustness against aggressions, at least up to a given
inhibitor release rate. For a non-stationary release of in-
hibitors the performance of the various types of systems
depends on the precise time dependence of the inhibitor
release rate. We have shown results for the case when the
release of inhibitors occurs sporadically but the time aver-
age rate remains constant; in this scenario, those systems
with a greater degree of organization performed better;
nevertheless those systems with a mixture of several de-
grees of organization exhibited robustness against aggres-
sions regardless of the specific way in which inhibitors were
released.
We have also considered the case in which the sys-
tems can release inhibitors into the environment under
prefixed conditions and at a given cost. As shown in Fig.
7, when the systems are allowed to produce inhibitors,
distinct regimes occur. In these circumstances, when the
cost of an aggression is modest, emergent cooperation may
arise between M-systems. We also observed that full-scale,
one-sided aggression is profitable only for less organized
systems.
Finally, we have allowed for the coevolution of the sys-
tems parameters as a function of the substrate supply
rate; specifically, we considered the degree of organization
within each system (as reflected by the monomer frac-
tion f iM ) and the conditions under which inhibitors are
released (as represented by the critical production υicri),
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and have found that the interplay between cooperative
configurations and the possibility to decrease the produc-
tion of others by the release of inhibitors result in a rich
variety of behaviors. For very low values of the substrate
supply rate many units remain idle, and therefore aggres-
sions are irrelevant; in this situation most systems have a
high degree of organization. As the substrate supply rate
is increased aggressions become frequent, making systems
with a low degree of organization competitive. However,
when an important fraction of units (∼ 1/2) are occupied
the set of systems displays global evolutive transitions be-
tween periods of calm (low aggression and high degree
of organization) and periods of belligerence (high aggres-
sion and low degree or organization). In the competing
gangs example, this corresponds to extended periods of
relative calm, followed by periods of frequent aggressions.
For larger values of the substrate supply rate the periods
of aggression become progressively rarer and shorter, and
finally, when the substrate supply rate approaches the full
occupation rate S˙F = NeNg/τ , the selection pressure on
the degree of organization and the aggression disappear.
Among the parameters considered in the model, the
number of units in a cooperative arrangement and the co-
operativity factor α are particularly relevant, since they
determine both the degree of organization and the effi-
ciency of the cooperation between units. The results allow
us to infer that further increases in the degree of organiza-
tion (cooperative arrangements with more than four units)
would increase the vulnerability of a system in the pres-
ence of aggression (which, as we have seen, is associated
to situations of relative resource scarcity), but at the same
time they would also increase the productivity of the sys-
tem when resources are plentiful. We have analyzed a sit-
uation where only M-systems and T-systems are involved;
if cooperative arrangements of three elements would have
been considered instead of T-systems the results would
have been analogous, since the degree or organization is
still greater than that of M-systems. Computational con-
siderations limited the number of systemsNg as well as the
number of units per system Ne. However, we performed
simulations for two cases to see if the bistable behavior ob-
served in Sec. 4 for S˙ = S˙F /2 persists for different system
sizes. We considered the cases Ne/Ng = 60/10 and 240/40
with corresponding half-occupation resource supply rates
S˙F /2 = 3 and S˙F /2 = 48, respectively. Additionally, we
adjust the condition that limits the maximum number of
free inhibitors at any time (one in the Ne/Ng = 120/20
case studied in Sec. 4) to make these cases comparable.
The bistable behavior is also observed in these cases; how-
ever as as Ne and Ng are increased the periods of calm
and aggression become more stable; that is, they become
longer in duration and with less variations around the qua-
sistable states.
In the simulations shown here the supply of resources
and the number and size of systems are held constant
for all generations. However, self-regulatory processes can
modify the number and size of the systems, and the supply
of resources can change in time. In the competing gangs
example one expects that the number of costumers per
drug-seller evolves in time taking into account the increase
of desertions during high violence periods (corresponding
to low number of customers per drug-seller) and increase
of recruitment during non-violent periods (corresponding
to high number of customers per drug-seller). Other ques-
tions remain open in this study. How do the trajectories of
the model parameters depend on the selection rules and on
the mutation rate, on the size and number of systems and
on the ambient conditions? What are the spatio-temporal
patterns if the model is extended to a spatially structured
environment? However, this model is a first step to un-
derstand the interplay between competition, cooperation
and aggressions in a general context, and to model the
coevolution of the parameters of the interacting systems
under selection pressure.
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